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I. INTRODUCTION

The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral remedy1 available to
3
prisoners 2 who have exhausted all available appellate remedies.
Habeas corpus, which literally means "to have or produce the body,"
involves a court order directing the custodian of a prisoner to bring the
prisoner before the court in order to assess the validity of the
prisoner's confinement. 4 The importance of habeas corpus in the
federal system has been recognized since the drafting of the
Constitution 5 and its historical roots trace back as far as the 12th
Century in England. 6 It is a procedure designed to protect individuals
by forcing the government to "always be accountable to the judiciary
for a man's imprisonment." 7 Under our constitutional framework, the
courts established pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution ("federal courts"), through the writ of habeas corpus,
provide independent review of constitutional claims of error from both
8
state and military convictions.
When a federal court reviews a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus from either a state or military conviction, it almost always
reviews questions of fact or law that have been previously litigated in
the original judicial system. 9 The extent of federal review of the merits
of a claim is a product of both the scope of review-the range of issues
cognizable on review-and the standard of review-the level of
deference accorded to the original judicial system's determination of
the issue. Expanding the scope of review or decreasing the deference
1.
By collateral remedy, that is to say, a habeas proceeding is "independent of the
proceeding underlying the original detention." 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 2 (2003).
2.
As a general rule, in order to seek habeas relief, the petitioner must be confined or be
under some restraint as to his or her liberty. Id § 1.
3.
Id. § 13. A federal court generally cannot entertain a writ of habeas corpus if there is
available an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal or writ of error. Id.
4.
NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS, CASES AND MATERIALS 830-31 (2d ed. 2000).

5.
'The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
6.
COHEN & HALL, supra note 4, at 830.
7.
Id. (quoting Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963)).
8.
"Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)
(2000).
9.
See 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 49 (2003).
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in the standard of review has the effect of increasing a federal court's
ability to review determinations of the original judicial system, since
restrictions on the federal courts' ability to review have been removed.
The standard and scope of review applied by a federal court
implicate two types of competing policy considerations, which I shall
refer to as individual policy considerations and institutional policy
considerations. Increased federal review, either through a broadened
scope of review and/or a less deferential standard of review, furthers
individual policy considerations, such as the protection of individual
liberties. At the same time, however, increased federal review
undermines institutional policy considerations, such as the autonomy
of the original judicial system. Determining the proper standard and
scope of review, and, by extension, the proper level of federal review of
habeas petitions, involves striking a balance between these individual
and institutional policy considerations.
Until 1953, federal habeas review of both state court and
military court convictions was the same. A federal court would simply
ask whether the original court's jurisdiction was proper and end its
inquiry there. In Brown v. Allen, however, the Supreme Court
drastically expanded the scope of review for state habeas by
broadening the range of issues that were cognizable on review to
include claims alleging violations of the United States Constitution. 10
Further, Brown allowed federal courts to undertake essentially de
novo review of both state factual and legal determinations.
Less than four months after Brown's expansion of federal
12
review of state convictions, the Supreme Court, in Burns v. Wilson,
expanded the scope of review for military habeas beyond the
constraints of the jurisdictional inquiry. The Court, reasoning that
different policies apply in the military context than in the state
context, did not broaden the scope of review as far as it had for state
habeas. The Court limited federal courts to reviewing constitutional
claims that had not been dealt with "fully and fairly" by the military
courts.13 In doing so, the Court did not articulate a distinct standard of
review.
The Court's decision in Burns is problematic for at least three
reasons. First, the "rule" that emerges from the case is unclear as to
10. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
11. Id. at 463-64; see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 500 (1963) ("[Elver since Brown v. Allen the Supreme
Court has continued to assume, without discussion, that it is the purpose of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction to redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions ... .
12. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
13. Id. at 142, 144.
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when a federal court may review a constitutional claim of error. The
Court did not expand on what constitutes a "full and fair" dealing by
the military, such that federal review is precluded. As a result, the
Circuit Courts of Appeal have struggled for fifty years to find a
principled approach to determining the proper scope of review .for
military habeas. Some Circuits have attempted to lay out clear rules
prescribing when a federal court may review an issue, while others
have developed what can at best be classified as an ad hoc approach.14
Consequently, the issues that a military prisoner may raise in a
habeas proceeding depend on where the petitioner is incarcerated.
The second problem with the Burns decision is that many
Circuits have interpreted the decision as precluding habeas review of
factual determinations made by military courts. Some federal courts
preclude review of factual determinations because the Court, in laying
out its rule in Burns, provided little guidance as to how that rule
should be applied and interpreted. Because the Burns rule is so
ambiguous, most Circuits have attempted to interpret it by looking at
the policies underlying the decision. 15 The Court, however, couched its
policy rationales in terms of why the scope of review for military
habeas should not extend as far as the recently expanded scope of
review for state habeas. In relying so heavily on the difference
between military and state habeas, the Court forever cast military
habeas as a more restricted version of state habeas. State habeas has
drastically changed since Burns, and some Circuits have attempted to
preserve this lower level of federal review for military habeas by
drawing artificial boundaries as to which type of issues they can
review. Some courts have interpreted the case as allowing federal
review of military legal determinations but precluding federal review
16
of military factual determinations.
The final problem with the Burns decision is that because
federal review of state legal determinations has changed so much
since the case was decided, military habeas no longer meets the
perceived requirement of Burns that it constitute a more restricted
version of state habeas. With the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 17 and the Supreme Court's

14. See infra Part II.B.2.
15. Id.
16. The two Circuits that have most notably drawn a clear cut line between review of legal
determinations and review of factual determinations are the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. See
Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1990); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 200
(5th Cir. 1975).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
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decision in Williams v. Taylor,1 8 federal courts must now accord
significant deference to state legal determinations. This creates an
anomaly because some Circuits' interpretations of Burns allow for
what is essentially de novo review of military legal determinations. 19
If military habeas is supposed to be a less-intrusive version of state
habeas, then it seems rather odd, as a doctrinal matter, to accord more
deference to the legal findings of the state courts than to those of the
military courts. At least one Circuit has conformed its interpretation
20
of Burns to address this problem.
To address all of the problems of Burns, and to improve the
overall state of military habeas, this Note suggests that military
habeas and state habeas should be the same. More specifically, courts
should apply the standard and scope of review for state habeas, as it is
laid out in AEDPA, to military habeas. Applying AEDPA to military
habeas would change it in two ways. First, application of AEDPA
would expand the scope of review for military habeas to include review
of military factual determinations, though this review would be
subject to AEDPA's deferential standard of review for factual
determinations. Second, application of AEDPA would subject federal
review of military legal determinations to AEDPA's deferential
standard of review. 21 Both of these changes would improve the current
state of military habeas.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the military
criminal justice system and discusses the development of both military
and state habeas. Part III identifies the competing policy
considerations that go into determining the proper scope and standard
of review. Part III.A. identifies the individual and institutional policy
considerations common to both military and state habeas. Part III.B.
identifies the special needs policy consideration, which is unique to
military habeas, and concludes that this consideration is furthered by
deference to determinations that are products of military expertise.
This Note argues that legal determinations by the military criminal
justice system are products of military expertise and that factual
determinations are not. Part IV explains how application of AEDPA
would improve military habeas.

18. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
19. See infra Part II.B.2.
20. See Brosius v. Warden, 278 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2002).
21. Currently, under the Calley standard, federal courts may review only claims that allege
a violation of the federal Constitution. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 199 (5th Cir. 1995).

1392

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:4:1387

II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Overview of the Military Justice System
Military law is a body of jurisprudence that exists independently
of the law that governs the federal judicial branch. 22 Article I, Section
8 of the United States Constitution vests Congress with power to
"make rules for the ... regulation of land and naval [florces." 23
Congress established the modern military criminal justice system
when it passed, in 1950, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). 24 After World War II, there was an outcry against the thenexisting military justice system because it was perceived as unjust and
arbitrary. 25 The UCMJ, among other things, established uniform
substantive and procedural law across all branches of military service
and created centralized review panels within each service. 26
Courts-martial are the military equivalent of civilian trial
courts. While civilian trial courts are primarily concerned with
dispensing justice, courts-martial serve the dual purpose of dispensing
justice and maintaining discipline within the armed services. 27 The
subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial is limited to violations of
the UCMJ. 28 In order for a court-martial to have subject matter
jurisdiction, the offense need not be "service-connected," that is, the
offense need not be committed on military property or while on duty
for the military. 29 The accused need only be a member of the armed
services at the time the offense was committed. 30 In order for
jurisdiction to be proper, the court-martial must also be properly

22. MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
ALL THE SERVICES 2 (1999).

23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14. One of the reasons for vesting Congress with this power
was to avoid the "political-military power struggle" that was so common with the British court.
martial system. Major Richard D. Rosen, Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System:
CollateralReview of Courts-Martial,108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 19 (1985).

24.
CRIM. L.
25.
26.
27.

Nicole E. Jaeger, Supreme Court Review: Maybe Soldiers Have Rights After All, 87 J.
& CRIMINOLOGY 895, 900 (1997).
Id.
Id. at 901.
See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-1

(5th ed. 1999).
28. DAVIDSON, supra note 22, at 1.
29. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436-37, 451 (1987) (affirming court-martial
conviction of service member for sexual abuse of two young girls that occurred off base).
30. Id. at 439.
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composed 3' and properly convened. 32 Furthermore, the charges must
33
be properly referred.
Depending on severity of an offense, one of three categories of
court-martial will try an accused service member. 34 The lowest-level
court-martial, a summary court-martial, is presided over by a single
commissioned officer who does not have to be a lawyer. 35 The
summary court-martial is a streamlined proceeding used for trying
only enlisted service members, not officers. 36 An accused must give
his consent to be tried by a summary court-martial, and a summary
court-martial may impose no punishment greater than confinement
with hard labor for one month or confinement without hard labor for
37
forty-five days.
The next level of court-martial is the special court-martial,
which is presided over by (1) a military judge, (2) three members (the
equivalent of jurors) sitting without a judge, or (3) a military judge
and three members. 38 The procedures used in a special court-martial
are more formal than those used in a summary court-martial, and the
maximum sentence that a special court-martial can impose is one year
39
confinement with hard labor.
The highest level of court-martial is the general court-martial,
which can only be convened after a pretrial investigation has occurred
and the convening authority has received a disposition of the
charges. 40 A general court-martial may impose the death penalty and
31. The three participants in a court-martial (the military judge, counsel and the court
members) must meet certain requirements. See DAVIDSON, supra note 22, at 8-9. For example, a
military judge must "be a commissioned officer, a member of a bar for a federal or state court,
and certified to be a military judge." Id. at 8.
32. Generally, a commanding officer orders a court-martial to be convened. DAVIDSON,
supra note 22, at 9 (citing UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 22-24) "A convening authority
will 'refer' or order the charges prosecuted at a specified level of court-martial once having
personally determined, or having been advised by a military lawyer, that reasonable grounds
exist to believe that the accused committed the charged offense .. " Id. at 55 (citing Rules for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 406, 601(a), (d)(1)). A convening authority cannot exceed its authority by
ordering a higher level court-martial than it is authorized to convene. See id. at 9.
33. A referral is "the order of a convening authority that charges against an accused will be
tried by a specified court-martial." Id. at 9 (quoting R.C.M. 601(a)). While minor changes from
the convening authority's order will be tolerated, if there are major changes made by the
government and the accused objects, or if the government substantially amends the order
without the convening authority's permission, then jurisdiction will be nullified. Id. at 10.
34. See SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 1-8(D).
35. Id. § 1-8(D)(1) (citing UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 16).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 20). Other punishments include
forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay or restriction for two months. Id.
38. Id. § 1-8(D)(2).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 1-8(D)(3) (citing UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 32, 34).
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is presided over by either a military judge or a combination of a
military judge and at least five panel members. 41
Because the military criminal justice system serves to
administer discipline as well as justice, its entire process focuses on
the commander of a military unit and the chain of command. 42 The
authority to convene a specific level of court-martial is not related to
rank but rather to the level of command that an officer possesses. 43
The court-martial usually begins with a decision by the immediate
commander of a military unit that a violation of the UCMJ has
occurred. 44 If the immediate commander decides to use the judicial
process as a means of discipline, rather than using some form of
nonjudicial punishment, he swears out charges and forwards them up
through the chain of command along with any documentary evidence
and recommendations as to the type of court-martial that should be
45
convened.
The next commander in rank above the immediate commander
normally has the power to convene the summary court-martial and is
accordingly referred to as a summary court-martial convening
authority. 46 A summary court-martial convening authority has several
options. He can dismiss the charges, refer the charges to a summary
court-martial, return the charges to the immediate commander with
an order as to how to dispose of the charges, forward the charges,
along with his recommendations, to the special court-martial
convening authority, or order an Article 32 investigation 47 if he
believes that the charge will ultimately warrant a general courtmartial. 48 Depending on the severity of the charge, ultimately, an
officer with the proper level of authority will order that a courtmartial be convened at one of the three levels.

41.

Id. (citing UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 16(1)).

42. Id. § 1-1, 1-8.
43. Id. § 4-14(A)(1). "A 'military commander' is the commanding officer of certain military
units, including posts or bases, Army brigades, Air Force wings, and Naval vessels." Note,
Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1911 n.8 (1990) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 822
(1988)). With only a few exceptions, the authority to convene a court-martial is vested in
commanding officers, as opposed to specifically ranked officers in the military. DAVIDSON, supra
note 22, at 9.
44.

SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 1-8(A).

45. It is typically the accused's immediate commanding officer "who after conducting a
preliminary inquiry, directs that that charges be drafted." See id. § 6-1.
46. Id. § 6-2(A).
47. This investigation has been noted as being equivalent to the grand jury in the civilian
sector. Charles W. Schiesser & Daniel H. Benson, A Proposalto Make Courts-MartialCourts: The
Removal of Commanders from Military Justice, 7 TEX. TECH L. REV. 559, 571 (1976).
48. SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 6-2(B).
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The convening authority selects the members of the courtmartial panel. 49 Unlike civilian juries, panel members do not have to
be randomly selected. 50 Further, the members are not required to
resemble a "representative cross-section of the military community",
as is required for civilian jurors.5 1 The process of selecting members
usually involves selecting potential members from a list compiled by
52
the personnel office.
If a service member is convicted by a court-martial, he first
appeals to the convening authority, which can overrule or affirm the
finding of guilt, reduce the sentence, or order a rehearing. 53 Then,
depending on the severity of his sentence, a service member can
appeal his conviction to either a court of criminal appeals within his
branch, which has the authority to review the factual and legal basis
for the conviction, or to the Office of the Judge Advocate General,
which has the authority to reduce or throw out the findings and/or
sentence. 54 If he is unsuccessful at this level, he can next appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), which is
composed of five civilian judges. 55 The CAAF will accept review of a
case only if two judges vote to do so, but certain cases, such as death
penalty cases must be accepted for review. 56 Importantly, the CAAF
has only the authority to review legal findings.5 7 A convicted service
member's final option is to seek review by the United States Supreme
Court. As in civilian cases, however, the Supreme Court rarely grants
58
a petition for certiorari.

49. Id. § 8-2.
50. Id. § 8-3(C)(4).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. DAVIDSON, supra note 22, at 62 (citing R.C.M. 1107).
54. If the sentence involves death, dismissal, dishonorable discharge, or confinement of at
least one year then the conviction will automatically be submitted for review to a court of
criminal appeals. Id. at 62 (citing R.C.M. 1201(a)). These courts have the authority to review
both factual and legal findings of the court-martial. Id. Lesser offenses are heard by the Office of
the Judge Advocate General. Id. (citing R.C.M. 1201(b)).
55. Id. at 62-63.
56. Id. at 63.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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B. The Development of Military Habeas
1. Pre-BurnsMilitary Habeas and the Burns Decision
Though Congress established a separate criminal justice
system for the military by generally failing to provide for direct review
of military court decisions by federal courts, prisoners convicted by
military courts can still seek collateral review, in the form of habeas
review, of their convictions. 59 Even though the UCMJ provides that
decisions by courts-martial are binding and conclusive on all courts,
collateral review remains a viable remedy because the independence
of the military criminal justice system relies on the assumption that
the courts act within their jurisdiction and duties. 60
The authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus was originally
conferred upon the federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
was the first grant of federal court jurisdiction. 61 The writ was
available to federal prisoners and military prisoners but was not
available to state prisoners. Since the statute did not define the scope
of issues cognizable on review, the Supreme Court defined the scope in
accordance with the common law and limited it to determining
whether the jurisdiction of the sentencing court was proper. 62 With the
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,63 Congress extended
availability of the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners. 64
Prior to 1867, there were very few collateral attacks on military
convictions. In fact, it was not until 1879 that the Supreme Court
reviewed its first petition for habeas corpus from a court-martial
conviction. 65 From 1867 to 1953, the inquiry in military habeas cases
broadened in application beyond the inquiry into whether a courtmartial had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. The Court
59. John E. Theuman, Annotation, Review by Federal Civil Courts of Court-Martial
Convictions-ModernStatus, 95 A.L.R. FED. 472, 481 (1989).
60. Id.
61. The act allowed federal courts to issue the writ to petitioners "in custody, under or by
colour of the authority of the United States .... " Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73,
81-82.
62. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S 465, 475 (1976) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193
(1830) (Marshall, C.J.)). The Supreme Court limited the scope of review to the jurisdictional
inquiry in 1879. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S 13 (1879). If a court-martial had jurisdiction, "its
proceeding cannot be collaterally impeached for any mere error or irregularity." Id. at 23.
63. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2000)).
64. The writ of habeas corpus was extended to state prisoners to prevent the South from
undermining the Thirteenth Amendment after the Civil War. Rosen, supra note 23, at 41 n.223.
65. Id. at 20 (citing Reed, 100 U.S. 13).
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still framed the issue as part of a jurisdictional inquiry, but it began to
look at the sentence to ensure that it was within the scope of the
lawful powers of the court-martial. 66 The Court also entertained
constitutional attacks leveled at court-martial proceedings. 67 The
Court continued to insist, however, that it was only inquiring into the
68
jurisdiction of the court-martial.
Finally, in the landmark case Burns v. Wilson,69 the Court
explicitly broadened the scope of review for courts-martial by
acknowledging that a federal court could assert jurisdiction over
petitions in which a prisoner asserted that his conviction or
sentencing occurred in violation of the United States Constitution.
The Court stated that a federal court reviewing constitutional claims
of error must recognize that "when a military decision has dealt fully
and fairly with an allegation raised in that application, it is not open
to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the
evidence." 70 Rather, "[i]t is the limited function of the civil courts to
determine whether the military have given fair consideration to each
of these claims." 71 If the military courts refuse to consider a convicted
service member's constitutional claims, then a reviewing federal court
may engage in de novo review of the claims. 72 The Court then applied
this new "rule" to the case at hand and found that the military courts
73
had given "fair consideration" to each of the prisoner's claims.
The Court advanced several rationales for its decision to
expand the scope of review for military habeas. All of these rationales,

66. The inquiry was "[d]id the court martial which tried and condemned the prisoner have
jurisdiction, of his person, and of the offense charged, and was the sentence imposed within the
scope of its lawful powers?" Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416, 418 (1922) (emphasis added).
67. In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), the Court assessed a claim by a service member
that he had been placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that it sidestepped the important issue, "To
what extent a court-martial's overruling of a plea of former jeopardy is subject to collateral
attack in habeas corpus proceedings." Id. at 688 n.4. Throughout the opinion, there was no
mention of how the Court's assessment of the Fifth Amendment claim fit within the
jurisdictional inquiry. One could argue that the court-martial would lose its jurisdiction when it
placed the defendant in double jeopardy, but as one commentator noted, "[o]nce the concept of
'jurisdiction' is taken beyond the question of the court's competence to deal with the class of
offenses charged and the person of the prisoner, it becomes a less than luminous beacon." Bator,
supra note 11 at 470.
68. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950) ("The single inquiry, the test, is
The correction of any errors it may have committed is for the military
jurisdiction ....
authorities alone authorized to review its decision.")
69. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
70. Id. at 142.
71. Id. at 144.
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id. at 144.
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however, explained why the Court had not expanded military habeas
review as far as it had recently expanded state habeas review. First,
the Court began with the proposition that the statute that granted
jurisdiction to the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus is the
same for both military and state habeas. 74 The scope of the matters
open for review, however, has always been narrower for military cases
than for civil cases. 75 The Court then went on to point out that the
evolution of military law, like the evolution of state law, has taken
place independently of the federal judiciary, and that the Court has
been highly deferential to such evolution. 6 The Court has played no
role in its development nor has it exerted a supervisory role because
the "rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance
77
to be struck in this adjustment."
Finally, the Court recognized that the framers of the
Constitution had entrusted to Congress the task of balancing the
rights of men in the armed forces against the need for discipline and
duty. 78 Congress exercised this power by enacting the UCMJ, which
creates a complete system of review to protect the individual rights of
service members and provides that determinations of the military
courts are "final" and "binding."79 Because such determinations are
supposed to be final and binding, "in military habeas corpus cases,
even more than in state habeas corpus cases, it would be in disregard
of the statutory scheme if the federal civil courts failed to take account
of the prior proceedings--of the fair determinations of the military
tribunals."8 0
The Court used these policy rationales to justify its decision
that military habeas could not extend as far as state habeas. In
explicitly contrasting state and military habeas, however, the Court
cast military habeas not as a separate body of law, but as a narrower
version of state habeas. More importantly, because, as discussed
74. Id. at 139.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Indeed, the Court recognized that Congress, after receiving a large number of
complaints and objections about the court-martial proceedings after World War II, had gone to
great effort to modernize the entire military system of justice. Id. at 140-41. World War II
provided the necessary catalyst for broadening the scope of habeas review because millions of
Americans had suddenly become subject to military justice. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184,
196 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. Burns, 346 U.S. at 142.
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below, the "rule" that emerges from Burns is so unclear, subsequent
interpretations of Burns by the Circuit Courts of Appeal have relied on
these various policy rationales to figure out how to apply Burns.
Relying on these policy rationales has led to conflicting interpretations
as courts have struggled to keep military habeas as a less intrusive
version of state habeas.
2. The Various Interpretations of Burns by the Circuit Courts.
Since Burns, lower courts have been unable to reach a
consensus regarding the proper interpretation of the case.8 1 Under
Burns, a reviewing federal court is not permitted to review claims that
have been dealt fully and fairly with by the military criminal justice
system. Uncertainty arises because the "fair" aspect of the test seems
to imply some sort of substantive review of the military's decision. It is
unclear, however, how much review of a constitutional claim a
military court must engage in before collateral review by a federal
court is prohibited. Must the military court come to the correct
decision, or is it enough that the court merely rules on the claim? It is
also unclear whether military courts may summarily dismiss such a
claim or whether they must produce a record that shows that the
decision was supported by reasoned deliberation. While all courts
essentially agree that a federal court cannot simply reweigh the
evidence, the courts are split on what determinations of the military
they can review.
The D.C. Circuit essentially treats military cases like state
cases. In determining whether a military court has given "fair"
consideration to a prisoner's constitutional claim, the court inquires
into the substantive decision of the military court.8 2 In order for a
claim to be "fairly" determined, the military court's decision must
either conform to the prevailing standards of the Supreme Court or
the military courts must show that conditions peculiar to military life

81. One commentator has suggested that the "full and fair" consideration test is not difficult
to decipher because it is similar to the language used by the Court in Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S.
309 (1915) and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See Rosen, supra note 23, at 56-57. "It is a
test that focuses initially on the adequacy of the military's 'corrective processes,' rather than
upon the merits of a habeas petitioner's constitutional claims." Id. at 54. While this
interpretation, which focuses exclusively on the procedural aspects of the military courts, is
plausible, it appears that no Circuit court has ever adopted this interpretation. Perhaps this is
because when the vague language in Burns is considered in light of the then-recent decision of
Brown v. Allen, it appeared that the Supreme Court intended for some substantive review of the
military courts' decisions.
82. Kauffman v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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require a different rule.8 3 In so holding, the court in, Kauffmann v.
Secretary of the Air Force, rejected the notion that Burns had
established a different scope of review for military habeas than for
84
state habeas.
The Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit, which has the most
experience with habeas review of court-martial convictions due to the
location of the Disciplinary Barrack at Fort Leavenworth, interpret
Burns as establishing a scope of review that is narrower than the
scope of review for state habeas. In Dodson v. Zelez,8 5 the Tenth
Circuit, unable to interpret its own conflicting precedent, officially
adopted the four-prong test first announced by the Fifth Circuit in
86
Calley v. Callaway.
Under the Calley standard, in order for a claim to be
reviewable, a federal court must consider four factors.8 7
The
reviewing court must examine (1) whether the asserted error is of
substantial constitutional dimension, (2) whether the issue is one of
law rather than of disputed fact already determined by the military
tribunals, (3) whether factors peculiar to the military or important
military considerations require a different standard, and (4) whether
the military courts have given adequate consideration to the issue
raised in the habeas proceeding.8 8 Because of the second factor, one
explicit result of this test is that many, if not all, claims which involve
a mixture of law and fact are precluded from review. 9 This refusal to
engage in factual review makes the scope of review narrower for
military habeas than for state habeas, as factual review is currently
available under state habeas. 90 In developing this standard, the Fifth
Circuit recognized that Burns had announced a scope of review that
was broader than the old jurisdictional test but narrower than the
scope of review for state habeas. 9 1 The court then went on to rely on

83. Id. at 997. The court reasoned that "[t]he military establishment is not a foreign
jurisdiction; it is a specialized one." Id. To provide a perfunctory review of constitutional claims
by servicemembers is to deny servicemembers the benefits of habeas review. Id. Also, there is no
rational need unique to the military that justifies such minimal review. Id.
84. Id.
85. 917 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1990).
86. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. Id. at 199.
88. Calley, 519 F.2d at 199-203.
89. See id. at 200 (quoting Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949, 953-54 (Ct. Cl. 1966))
("[A]bstinence from reviewing court-martial proceedings need not necessarily be practiced 'where
the serviceman presents pure issues of constitutional law, unentangled with an appraisal of a
special set of facts."' ).
90. See Infra Part II.C.1.
91. Id. at 198.
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the same policy rationales in Burns to justify the narrow scope of
92
review that results from this four-prong test.
Some Circuits simply ignore the inherent ambiguity of Burns
and use an ad hoc approach. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
never tried to articulate a test as to what constitutes "full and fair"
consideration of a constitutional claim by the military courts. Though
case law is sparse, both Circuits appear to hold that the scope of
review for military habeas is narrower than the scope of review for
state habeas. 93 The Eighth Circuit appears to draw a law/fact
distinction, like the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, but it applies the Burns
"full and fair" consideration requirement only to military factual
determinations. 94 Under the Eighth's Circuit's jurisprudence, pure
issues of constitutional law may always be reviewed by a federal
court. 95 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, does not make this distinction
between factual and legal determinations, and is even less clear in its
96
application of Burns.
The Third Circuit's standard for determining the scope of
review is unique. In Brosius v. Warden, the Third Circuit recently
92. Id. at 199-203.
93. See, e.g., Harris v. Ciccone, 417 F.2d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing Swisher v. United
States, 354 F.2d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 1966)); Sunday v. Madigan, 301 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1962)
("[O]nce it has been concluded by the civil courts that the military had jurisdiction and dealt
fully and fairly with all such claims, it is not open to such courts to grant the writ simply to reevaluate the evidence." (citation omitted); Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1955)
(dismissing habeas petition without even reaching the merits of the claim because the Military
Board of Review had "fully and carefully examined" the claim).
94. Harris, 417 F.2d at 481 ("[W]here the constitutional issue involves a factual
determination, the court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the military court gave full
and fair consideration to the constitutional issues."). It should also be noted that the Eight
Circuit has never articulated a standard for what constitutes "full and fair consideration." In
Schlomann v. Ralston, the court affirmed a district court's dismissal of a habeas petition even
though the district court did not examine the transcript from the court-martial. 691 F.2d 401,
403 (8th Cir. 1982). A military court of appeals had previously reviewed the transcript and
"thoroughly discussed" the issue being raised. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that this constituted a "full and fair" opportunity for litigation, at least absent a showing
of substantial doubt that the military court was incorrect. Id. at 403-04.
95. In Harris, after determining that factual determinations are subject to the "full and fair
consideration" requirement of Burns, the court went on to note that military "courts-martial as
an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."
Harris,417 F.2d at 481 (citing O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969)). The implication
is that federal courts should be more scrutinizing when it comes to pure issues of law, and are
therefore not precluded from reviewing them. Concededly, however, there is very little case law
in the Eighth Circuit to support this law/fact distinction and the Eighth Circuit has not revisited
the issue since Harris.
96. See, e.g., Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1972); Mitchell, 224 F.2d
at 367. In both of these cases, the court cited the rule from Burns and then summarily concluded
that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to the issues being raised. See also
Sunday, 301 F.2d at 873 (reiterating the rule from Burns without providing any guidance on how
to apply it).
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abandoned any attempt to apply the Burns standard in particular
cases. 97 Rather, the court began its analysis with the proposition that
"our inquiry in a military case may not go further than our inquiry in
a state habeas case."9 8 The court then proceeded to assess the military
courts' decision, for argument's sake, as if it were a final decision from
a state court. 99 Applying AEDPA's standard and scope of review to the
petitioner's Miranda claims, the court found that the petitioner had
failed to establish that the military court's decision was "contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court." 10 0 The Third Circuit's
decision to abandon any hope of extracting a rule from Burns
illustrates the level of frustration that lower courts have experienced
in interpreting the case. 10 1
C. The Development of State Habeas
The development of state habeas followed much the same
pattern as did the development of military habeas. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen, decided just four months
before Burns, the scope of review for military and state habeas was
exactly the same. Both state and military habeas started with a
jurisdictional inquiry, which was gradually loosened through general
application. Eventually, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of
inquiry to allow for review of claims of constitutional error.
Prior to 1953, the Supreme Court had a fairly strict
interpretation of what could be reviewed on a habeas petition from a
state conviction. Limited to the jurisdictional inquiry, the Court
repeatedly refused to look for substantive error on the part of the state
courts. 0 2 Just as with military habeas, however, two exceptions to the
jurisdictional inquiry developed. Federal courts could review the
97. Brosius v. Warden, 278 F.3d 239, 245 (3rd Cir. 2002).
98. Id. (citing Burns v. Wilson, , 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953)).
99. Id. at 245-48.
100. Id. at 246.
101. The First Circuit has also acknowledged a great deal of frustration in interpreting
Burns. In Allen v. VanCantfort, the court examined the Burns decision and noted that there was
great confusion among courts and commentators as to when a reviewing court was precluded
from reviewing a military conviction because the military court had fully and fairly considered
the constitutional issues. 436 F.2d 625, 629-30 (1st Cir. 1971). Because of the disagreement as to
what constitutes full and fair consideration, the court opted to "review briefly petitioner's claims
on the merits", which included a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 630.
102. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193 (1830) (refusing to reach merits of a petitioner's
claim that the petitioner was convicted pursuant to an indictment that failed to state a crime);
Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. 38 (1822) (declining to examine whether petitioner's refusal to testify
was privileged under the Fifth Amendment).
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alleged illegality of a sentence10 3 and facial constitutionality of a state
statute.10 4 In addition to these two exceptions, in 1915 the Court
signaled a shift in its view of the proper role of federal courts by
interpreting the Act of 1867 to explicitly allow the courts to undertake
more than a "bare legal review" to determine if jurisdiction was
proper. 0 5 The Court, in Frank v. Magnum, held that a state court had
to afford proper process with respect to the full and fair litigation of
federal questions in order for jurisdiction to be proper. 10 6 If there was
no "corrective process" with respect to the full and fair litigation of
federal questions, then the federal court could go to the merits of the
10 7
federal question.
In Brown v. Allen, 0 8 the Court finally shed the restrictions of
the jurisdictional inquiry and broadened the scope of review for state
habeas. The Court decided Brown less than four months before its
decision in Burns, in which it broadened the scope of review for
military habeas. In what was a combination of three habeas
proceedings, the Court in Brown affirmed the convictions of three
prisoners. However, it did so by reaching the merits of the
constitutional claims of the prisoners without any mention of
jurisdiction. 0 9 In doing so, the Court adopted the rule that federal
courts are not barred by the principle of res judicata from
reconsidering federal constitutional claims previously considered by
state courts. Federal courts were essentially allowed to engage in de
novo review of these claims." 0
1. The Development of Federal Review of State Factual
Determinations.
After Brown, federal review of state factual determinations was
relatively unconstrained. The federal courts were free to examine the
state-court record to make sure that there was fair consideration of
constitutional issues and that the offered evidence and proceedings

103. See Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
104. See Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
105. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).
106. Id. at 326-27.
107. Though the Court in Frank did find that the prisoner had been afforded a full and fair
litigation as to the particular federal question, the lower courts were now left with a new line of
inquiry in addition to the traditional jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 335.
108. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
109. For example, in Brown v. Allen, the Court evaluated the petitioners' claim that
discrimination against blacks in the selection of grand jurors violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 474.
110. See Bator, supra note 11, at 500.
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'
A federal court had wide
resulted in a "satisfactory conclusion."111
discretion in deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, and it
was basically up to a federal judge to decide whether he felt1 2that the
1
issue raised by the defendant was worthy of reconsideration.
Federal review of state factual determinations became even
more unconstrained after the case of Townsend v. Sain.113 In
Townsend, the Court identified six scenarios in which a federal court
was required to grant an evidentiary hearing:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the factfinding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair
hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full
11 4
and fair hearing.

The effect of this holding was to compel a district court to relitigate
state factual determinations at the slightest indication that the state
court had not dealt with the constitutional issues in a complete and
fair manner. 115 In 1966, Congress attempted to codify the holding in
Townsend by adding subsection (d) to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.116
The Court further strengthened the power of the federal courts
to review state court decisions in Fay v. Noia,117 a decision that
loosened the requirement that a prisoner exhaust all appellate
remedies before he could seek collateral review in the federal system.
The Court held that the exhaustion requirement "refers only to a
failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant at the time
he files his application for habeas corpus in the federal court."' 118 After
Fay, federal courts were not only free to review constitutional claims
raised by prisoners but were required in some circumstances to review
factual claims that had not even been fully litigated in the state court
system.
Inevitably, friction arose between the state courts and the
federal courts because of the intensive review of state convictions by

111. Brown, 344 U.S. at 463.
112. Id. at 463-64.
113. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
114. Id. at 313.
115. Rosen, supra note 23, at 66.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (superseded)).
117. 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see also Rosen, supra note 23, at 66 (discussing the implications of
both cases).
118. Noia, 372 U.S. at 399. In Noia, the habeas petitioner had failed to timely appeal to a
state appellate court a claim that this confession had been obtained in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 395.
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federal courts. The Supreme Court responded by limiting the use of
habeas as means of appellate review. 119 Stone v. Powel1120 is perhaps
the best example of the court's desire to curb federal review of state
convictions. That decision limited the scope of review for state habeas
by holding that a federal court could not grant habeas relief when a
state court had provided "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of
a Fourth Amendment claim and the claim of error was that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure had been
introduced during the state-court trial. 12 ' The Court further restricted
state habeas by strengthening the requirement that a petitioner's
claims must be thoroughly exhausted in the state system before a
federal court could review the claim. 22 Ironically, however, the Court
most effectively accomplished its restriction of state habeas by
according more deference to state fact-finding through a strict
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a statute that was supposed to
roughly codify the liberal standard for reviewing factual
determinations announced in Townsend. 23
In 1996, Congress once again stepped in. Prompted by outcries
for habeas reform, Congress passed AEDPA, which amended both
procedural and substantive aspects of federal habeas corpus review.
Congress was driven to make this change because of the endless
litigation that had resulted from Brown's removal of any meaningful
restrictions on federal review of state convictions. 24 AEDPA provides
119. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981).
120. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
121. Id. at 494.
122. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (holding that a state court must have a
"fair opportunity" to rule on a constitutional claim and that "it is not enough that all of facts
necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar
state-law claim was made." (citation omitted)); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding
that a federal court "must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted
claims").
123. The Court's strongest reform came through a stringent requirement that the federal
courts must presume that a state court's factual determination is correct. See Sumner v. Mata,
449 U.S. 539, 547-52 (1981) (holding that a reviewing federal court must give a "presumption of
correctness" to state factual determinations under § 2254(d) and that "a habeas court should
include in its opinion granting the writ the reasoning" for its decision).
124. See, e.g., Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners'Abuse of the Judicial
Process: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995).
"As of January 1, 1995, there were approximately 2,976 inmates on death row in this
country. Yet the States have executed only 263 criminal since 1973, and only 38 last
year. Federal habeas proceeding have become, in effect, a second round of appeals in
which convicted criminals are afforded the opportunity to relitigate claims already
considered and rejected by the State courts."
Id. at 2 (Statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). The delays caused by endless federal review were
very real, particularly in capital cases. Between 1977 and 1993, in cases involving capital
punishment, the average delay was about 94 months, almost eight years. Id. at 105 (Prepared
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that a writ of habeas corpus must now be granted to review state court
factual determinations only if the state court's adjudication "resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding."'125 AEDPA also provides that a federal court must
presume that a state court's decision was correct. 126 However, a
petitioner can rebut that presumption by showing that the decision
was wrong by "clear and convincing evidence."'127 In enacting AEDPA,
Congress also deleted the eight possible scenarios 28 capable of
rebutting the presumption of correctness under the previous version of
§ 2254(d). Because the scenarios no longer act as proxies of unfairness,
capable of sweeping aside any presumption of correctness, the
petitioner now must carry a greater burden to prove procedural and
substantive fact-finding errors. 129 Importantly, though, AEDPA still
statement of Kevin DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division United
States Department of Justice). In 1992 and 1993 the average delay was around 113 months, over
nine years. Id.
To address these problems AEDPA, in addition to restricting substantive federal review, also
added several procedural requirements to prevent prisoners from abusing the writ of habeas as
an endless appellate device. First, AEDPA makes it much more difficult for a petitioner to reraise issues that have been decided in a previous habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000).
AEDPA also makes it very difficult to raise different claims in a second habeas petition when the
claims were not originally brought in the first petition. See § 2244(b). Finally, in an effort to force
prisoners to bring their claims in a timely manner, AEDPA has a one-year statute of limitations
for filing a petition that starts tolling in most cases when the prisoner's conviction and sentence
becomes final. § 2244(d).
125. § 2254(d)(2). If the petitioner failed to develop at the state court level the factual basis
for a claim, the district court may not hold an evidentiary hearing unless:
(A). the claim relies on (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence; and
(B)the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
§ 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B).
126. § 2254(e)(1).
127. Id.
128. There were seven specific factors listed that could rebut the presumption of correctness
or the presumption could be rebutted if the reviewing federal court concluded that the state
court's determination was not "fairly supported by the record." See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (1994)
(superseded).
129. See, e.g., Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948-51 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the
argument that a "full and fair hearing" is a prerequisite for the § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of
correctness to apply).
It should also be noted that there is some disagreement as to the precise interaction between
§ 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1). See, e.g., RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 826-31 (4th ed. 2001) (arguing that the exceptions,
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allows greater habeas review of state factual determinations than of
military factual determinations. This is so because some Circuits do
not permit review of military factual determinations at all.
2. The Development of Federal Review of State Legal Determinations.
After Brown, the standard of review applied to state legal
determinations unquestionably remained de novo until the Supreme
Court's decision in Teague v. Lane.130 Teague called into question the
de novo standard with language that suggested a more deferential
standard of review, 131 but it was unclear from that opinion whether it
overruled Brown's de novo standard of review. In later cases the Court
particularly procedural exceptions, to the presumption of correctness survived under § 2254(d)(2)
and (e)(1), and that federal courts should undertake an analysis very similar to the pre-AEDPA §
2254(d)); Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the New
28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1874-76 (1997) (discussing two plausible
interpretations of the relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)). The majority of Circuits,
however, ignore any kind of conflict and appear to view § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) as fairly
straightforward in application. See, e.g., Harding v. Walls, 300 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Under section 2254(d)(2), relief may be had where the petitioner can show by clear and
convincing evidence that the state court's factual determinations were unreasonable."); Valdez,
274 F.3d at 951 n.17 ("Whereas § 2254(d)(2) sets out a general standard by which the district
court evaluates a state court's specific findings of fact, § 2254(e)(1) states what an applicant will
have to show for the district court to reject a state court's determination of factual issues."); Coe
v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) ("If competency to be executed is a question of fact,
under § 2 2 54(e)(1) the state courts' competency determination is entitled to a presumption of
correctness that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. In addition, for
questions of fact a federal court may grant habeas relief 'only if the state court's decision was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding."' (citation omitted)); see also Hunterson v. Disbato, 308 F.3d 236, 245-46
(3d Cir. 2002); Fulwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 689 (4th Cir. 2002); Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d
1211 (10th Cir. 2002); Mastracchio v. Vose, 274 F.3d 590, 597-98 (1st Cir. 2001); Kinder v.
Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 541 (8th Cir. 2001); Mobley v. Head, 267 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir.
2001). But cf. Channer v. Brooks, 320 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that it is still an open
question within the Circuit as to whether the a petitioner must prevail on both the § 2254(d)(2)
and the § 2 254(e)(1) inquiries in order to obtain habeas relief, or whether prevailing under either
inquiry is sufficient to obtain relief); Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 672 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that "as an analytical matter, the relationship between 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) is not
entirely clear . . . . [but that] we need not define the precise relationship, however, as the
standard of review appears to be clear error under both statutory provisions.").
130. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
131. In Teague, the Court rejected a state prisoner's contention that he should be able invoke
a rule of constitutional law which was first decided after his conviction had become final. Id. at
310. Though framed in the context of retroactivity, numerous commentators pointed out that the
case was susceptible to an interpretation in which "federal relief would be unavailable if a state
court applying federal law existing at the time of the prisoner's conviction could reasonably
conclude that the prisoner was not entitled to relief." Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How Should AEDPA's Standard of Review Operate
After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1499. Under this interpretation, a federal
court would be precluded from granting relief even if it came to a different result in interpreting
and applying federal precedent. Id.
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struggled to clarify Teague and articulate whether it had in fact
overruled Brown, but the Court was unable to come to any
consensus.132
Ultimately, Congress weighed in with AEDPA and statutorily
amended the standard of review applied to state legal determinations.
AEDPA provides that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted
unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."'133
Unfortunately, even after the passage of AEDPA, courts were
uncertain as to how to evaluate state legal determinations. Though
the language of the statute suggests that federal courts should afford
deference to state legal determinations, so long as those
determinations are reasonable, many still argued that the statute
upheld independent federal review of state legal determinations.' 34
In 2000, the Supreme Court finally resolved the question in
Williams v. Taylor,'3 5 in which it interpreted the standard of review
required by AEDPA. 136 The Court began its analysis by recognizing
that Congress, in passing AEDPA, "wished to curb delays, prevent
retrials on federal habeas and give effect to convictions to the extent
possible under law."1 37 The Court gave effect to these goals by strictly
construing the statutory phrase, "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court."' 38 The Court determined that the
132. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990);
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
134. Steinman, supra note 131, at 1503-04 n.40 (citing to authorities who contended that
federal review was left unchanged with the passage of AEDPA).
135. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In writing the opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion
for the proper interpretation of § 2254(d). Id. at 402-13 (O'Connor, J.). Justice Stevens wrote the
majority for the proper application of § 2254(d) to the particular case at hand. Id. at 391-98
(Stevens, J.).
136. It should be noted that many commentators have criticized the decision in Williams for
failing to address numerous constitutional issues. See Steinman, supra note 131, at 1509. The
Court, in restricting its analysis to statutory interpretation, did not analyze the constitutionality
of Congress's ability to impose a deferential standard of review, nor did it analyze any of the
Article III implications of forcing lower courts to adhere to the deferential standard of review.
Some commentators have contended that federal courts must be able to review de novo state
legal determinations because Article III vests them with "judicial power [over] ...cases ...
arising under this constitution [and] the laws of the United States." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2). Others have argued that AEDPA forces lower courts to "violate their obligation under
Article III to follow their own precedents" because, if an issue of federal constitutional law has
not been decided by the Supreme Court, federal courts must defer to a state court's decision on a
federal issue, even if the state court's decision is completely inconsistent with precedent in the
Circuit in which the state court sits. Id.
137. Id. at 404.
138. Id. at 412.
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phrase referred to the holdings of the Court's decisions "as of the time
of the relevant state-court decision." 139 In so holding, the Court upheld
Teague's antiretroactivity rule, which stated that novel constitutional
standards that were not in existence at the time of the state court's
determination and that imposed new obligations on the states could
1 40
not be grounds for habeas relief.
Under AEDPA, the Court stated, a federal court may grant
habeas relief if the state court's decision is "contrary to" or involves
"an unreasonable application of' Supreme Court precedent.14 ' In
order for a state court's decision to be "contrary to" Supreme Court
precedent, the state court must either apply a rule that contradicts
governing law set forth in Supreme Court precedent or the state court
must confront a set of facts that are "materially indistinguishable"
from a decision of the Supreme Court and arrive at a different result
from the precedent. 142 If a federal court finds either of these two
143
scenarios present, the court may engage in de novo review.
The Court went on to further hold that an "unreasonable
application" of federal law occurs when the state identifies the correct
governing legal rule but then unreasonably applies it to the facts of a
prisoner's case. 144 In recognizing the difficulty inherent in defining the
term "unreasonable," the Court held that an "unreasonable"
application of federal law is different from an "incorrect" application of
law. 145 It is now insufficient grounds for a federal court to grant a writ
of habeas corpus because the court concludes that the state court
"incorrectly or erroneously" applied federal precedent. "Rather, that
application must also be unreasonable.' 4 6
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 404-05.

142. Id. at 405-06.
143. Id. at 406.
144. Id. at 407-08.
145. Id. at 410.
146. Id. at 411.
In Williams, the Court found an unreasonable application of law for two reasons. First, the
Virginia Supreme Court had relied on an "inapplicable exception" to the constitutional rule for
determining whether a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective counsel had occurred. Id. at 397.
The two-prong test for ineffective counsel requires that the defendant show 1) the counsel's
performance was deficient and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such
that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 390 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984)). The Virginia Supreme Court had misinterpreted two decisions after Strickland
as requiring a separate inquiry into whether the result of the state-court proceeding was
fundamentally unfair, even when the defendant was able to prove deficient performance and
prejudice as to the ultimate decision. Id. at 393.
Second, the Virginia Supreme Court also unreasonably applied the law because "it failed to
evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence" in order to determine if prejudice had
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF STATE AND MILITARY HABEAS

Before proceeding, it is first necessary to identify the policy
considerations involved in determining the proper scope and standard
of review for habeas petitions. The standard and scope of review for
both state and military habeas attempt to strike a balance between
individual
policy
considerations
and
institutional
policy
considerations. For the most part, these policy considerations are the
same for military and state habeas. Part III.A. will identify the
individual policy considerations that are common to both military and
state habeas and that justify increased federal review of both state
and military convictions. It will then identify the countervailing,
institutional policy considerations that are common to both state and
military habeas and that support less federal review. Part III.B. will
identify and attempt to flesh out the "special needs" policy
consideration that is unique to military habeas and that was invoked
by the Burns court to justify less federal review of military convictions
than of state convictions.
A. Policy ConsiderationsCommon to both State and Military Habeas
There are two individual policy considerations that support
federal review of military and state convictions. First, federal habeas
review vindicates constitutional liberties by protecting individuals
from government activity that violates their constitutional rights. It is
well established that both the States and the military must respect
federal constitutional liberties. 147 Having a federal court, which is
completely independent of the judicial systems of the States or the
military, engage in relatively unconstrained review of state or military
judicial determinations arguably ensures that fewer constitutional
violations will "slip through the cracks."
Second, habeas review deters state and military courts from
ignoring federally created constitutional rights. 148 "[T]he threat of

occurred. Id. at 397-98. To determine if the outcome of the sentencing might have changed had
Williams' counsel not been so deficient in presenting mitigating factors to the jury, the Virginia
Supreme Court was required to balance the aggravating factors to the crime that had been
presented at trial against the mitigating factors that had been introduced at trial and that had
come to light in post-conviction proceedings. See id. at 397-98 ('Mitigating evidence unrelated to
dangerousness may alter the jury's selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut
the prosecution's death-eligibility.") The Virginia Supreme Court had failed to even mention any
of the mitigating factors when it performed its prejudice analysis. Id. at 398.
147. See SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 1-1(B) (citation omitted).
148. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 579, 668 (1982).
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habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and
in a
appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings
1 49
standards.'
constitutional
established
with
manner consistent
If individual policy considerations were the only relevant policy
considerations for determining the standard and scope of review, then
there would be no problem with unrestricted federal review of state
and military convictions. However, there are countervailing,
institutional policy considerations that support restraint on the part of
a reviewing federal court. The first institutional policy consideration is
the interest of both the state courts and the military courts in finality.
The States and the military have an interest in the finality of their
judgments for two reasons. First, protracted litigation wastes precious
State and military economic resources. 150 Additionally, litigation
expends "intellectual, moral, and political resources ... [of the] legal
system."'151 Because no criminal justice system is completely free of
the possibility of error, either factual or legal, "[i]f one set of
institutions is as capable of performing the task at hand as another,

we should not ask both to do

it."152

Second, the effectiveness of

substantive criminal law depends on a certainty of judgment. 153 "A
procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into
facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of
confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with
the effectiveness of the underlying substantive commands."'154 To the
extent habeas review allows for extended litigation, there is greater
potential for the subversion of the deterrent effect of the criminal law.
Another institutional policy consideration that supports less
federal review is the fact that federal review undermines the
independence of both the state and military courts. Federal habeas
review of state convictions is inherently in tension with the notion
that the federal judicial system and the state judicial systems are
"coequal parts of our national judicial system."' 55 Like state law,

149. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
150. Bator, supranote 11, at 451.
151. Id.
152. Id. "[I]f a proceeding is held to determine the facts and law in a case, and the processes
used in that proceeding are fitted to the task in a manner not inferior to those which would be
used in a second proceeding, so that one cannot demonstrate that relitigation would not merely
consist of repetition and second-guessing, why should not the first proceeding 'count'?" Id.
153. Bator, supra note 11, at 451-52.
154. Id. at 452.
155. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990).
When this Nation was established by the Constitution, each State surrendered only a part of its
sovereign power to the national government. But those powers that were not surrendered were
retained by the States and unless a State was restrained by "the supreme Law of the Land" as
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military law exists "separate and apart from the law which governs in
our federal judicial establishment." 156
The Constitution entrusts
Congress with the task of balancing the rights of service members,
and Congress has done so by creating the UCMJ and a "complete
system of review" in the military courts to protect those rights. 157 To
the extent federal courts review and allow the relitigation of claims
decided by state and military courts, they undermine the
independence of those courts.
A final institutional policy consideration that warrants less
federal review is the fact that the "second-guessing" of state and
military court decisions can undermine the state and military judges'
own conception of their roles. It is possible that there is "nothing more
subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective
conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and
subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the
notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else." 158
Extensive and intrusive federal habeas review may have detrimental,
intangible effects on state and military judges' conceptions of, and
fulfillment of, their professional and institutional roles.
It should be pointed out that all of the policy considerations
that are common to both military and state habeas are implicated
regardless of the nature of the determination made by the original
state or military judicial system. Regardless of whether a federal court
is reviewing a legal determination, a factual determination, or a
expressed in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, it was free to exercise those
retained powers as it saw fit. One of the reserved powers was the maintenance of state judicial
systems for the decision of legal controversies. Many of the Framers of the Constitution felt that
separate federal courts were unnecessary and that the state courts could be entrusted to protect
both state and federal rights. Others felt that a complete system of federal courts to take care of
federal legal problems should be provided for in the Constitution itself. This dispute resulted in
compromise. One "supreme Court" was created by the Constitution, and Congress was given the
power to create other federal courts. In the first Congress this power was exercised and a system
of federal trial and appellate courts with limited jurisdiction was created by the Judiciary Act of
1789, 1 Stat 73.
While the lower federal courts were given certain powers in the 1789 Act, they were
not given any power to review directly cases from state courts, and they have not been
given such powers since that time .... Thus from the beginning we have had in this
country two essentially separate legal systems. Each system proceeds independently
of the other with ultimate review in this Court of the federal questions raised in either
system.
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1970).
156. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953); see also Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184,
219 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Congress has a substantial role to play in defining the rights of military
personnel.., and by enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice... it has assumed that
responsibility.").
157. Burns, 346 U.S. at 140.
158. Bator, supra note 11, at 451.
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determination involving a mixed question of law and fact, federal
habeas review implicates the individual and institutional policy
considerations mentioned above. As discussed below, the same is not
true for the special needs policy consideration of the military, which is
not implicated when federal courts review military factual
determinations.
B. The Special Needs Policy Considerationof the Military
There are many policy considerations common to both military
and state habeas that go into determining the proper standard and
scope of review. If these were the only policy considerations, then
there would be very little room to argue that state and military habeas
review should be different, since the same policy considerations would
justify the same treatment.
The Burns decision, however, justified less federal habeas
review of military convictions than of state convictions because the
"rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance
to be struck in this adjustment." 159 The Burns Court recognized that
the military justice system, by virtue of its knowledge and expertise, is
generally the proper institution for determining the substantive
constitutional rights of service members.160 At the same time,
however, by expanding military habeas corpus review beyond its
historical boundaries, the Court indicated that it was not willing to
give the military near absolute decisional authority over the
constitutional claims of service members. In order to justify less
federal review of military convictions than of state convictions, the
Court in Burns relied on the special needs policy consideration.
Simply stated, the special needs policy consideration is the
military's need to maintain discipline in order to operate effectively.
The military criminal justice system, like all state criminal justice
systems, exists to provide justice. 16 1 Unlike the state criminal justice
systems, however, the military criminal justice system also exists to
maintain discipline. 162 With large numbers of personnel deployed
worldwide, the military judicial system needs to be flexible enough so

159. Burns, 346 U.S. at 140.
160. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1224
(1970).
161. See SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 1-1.

162. See id.
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that it can function in times of peace or conflict. 163 The military
requires "certainty of punishment, especially when extreme
circumstances necessitate disregard for civilian notions of individual
rights, and on the peculiar nature of the military environment." 164
The best way for the military criminal justice system to
effectuate its dual goals of justice and discipline is to allow the
military to determine for itself the constitutional rights of service
members and only allow federal judicial intervention in extreme
circumstances. 165 The military must be able to determine the
constitutional rights of its service members in order to avoid overly
burdensome constitutional standards that would interfere with the
military's operational effectiveness. This fundamental need to
maintain discipline "may render permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."166
Federal review of military convictions is distinct from federal
review of state convictions because military judges possess an
expertise with regard to the exigencies of military life. In order to
qualify as a military judge who may preside over a court-martial, an
individual, in addition to being a member of a bar of a federal court or
of the highest court of a state, must also be both a commissioned
officer and certified as qualified for duty as a military judge by the
Judge Advocate General of the branch of the armed forces in which
the individual serves. 167 The judges who sit on the Court of Criminal
Appeals for each military branch are usually senior judge advocates,
although civilians are sometimes appointed. 168 "Unless a federal judge
has more than just a passing familiarity with the military, it is
difficult to appreciate how he or she can properly apply constitutional
standards to unique military circumstances."'' 69 Even in the heyday of
Brown v. Allen, there was a general recognition that de novo review of
military determinations was impermissible due to the "unfamiliarity
of civilian judges with the distinctive purposes and problems of the
170
military law."'
Having identified the special needs policy consideration of the
military, the question then becomes, under what circumstances is the
special needs policy consideration implicated? When does federal
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Developments in the Law, supra note 160, at 1224.
Id.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 4-15(A).
Id. § 17-15.
Rosen, supra note 23, at 86.
Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380, 396 (1966).
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review of a determination by the military criminal justice system have
the potential to interfere with the operations of the military? The
answer is that the potential for interference exists when the
challenged determination is a product of military expertise not
possessed by civilian judges. The determinations that implicate the
expertise of the military, this Note submits, involve questions of law
but not questions of fact.
When a court-martial sits as a fact-finder, it functions no
differently than a civilian court. 171 The purpose of reviewing factual
determinations is to determine whether the military reached a
reasonable conclusion about what occurred in a given case. It is
difficult to conceive of a way in which the unique experience of a
military judge or a court-martial panel would somehow make them
more adept at assessing factual issues than civilian judges or juries.
In addition, while findings of fact have legal significance, the actual
overturning of a factual finding does not impose any new
constitutional obligations on the military. The potential for significant
interference with military operations does not exist when federal
courts review factual determinations.
In contrast to determinations of fact, determinations of law do
implicate the expertise of the military. Whether crafting a new
constitutional standard or applying an existing one, the military
courts are institutionally better suited to properly balance the rights
of service members against the special needs of the military. 172 For
example, one court has recognized that "[t]he great difference of
military life makes exceedingly difficult the attempts by federal courts
to perceive the proper contours of due process necessary in courtmartial proceedings."1 73 Military experience also provides a unique
perspective in the area of the Fourth Amendment because an active
service member's expectation of privacy might be different than that of
a civilian. 174
Some have argued that military expertise is implicated only
when a determination deals with military matters and that not all
questions of law implicate the expertise of the military. 175 This Note
171. Id. at 400 ("The court-martial, for example, functions basically as a jury in deciding
questions of fact ....
!).
172. Even the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which is composed of civilian judges,
is institutionally in a better position to assess military questions of law, as it is a specialized
court that focuses exclusively on military matters.
173. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 201 n.25 (5th Cir. 1975).
174. Rosen, supra note 23, at 86.
175. See Note, Civilian Court Review of Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
1259, 1278 (1969) ('The distinction must be made between 'military determinations relating to
demands of a tactical situation' and 'problems that lack any distinctive military flavor'. . ..
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contends that all questions of law facing military courts implicate the
expertise of the military to some degree, because the military way of
life so pervades military law. The military criminal justice system is
separate and distinct from the federal judicial system, and it has a
separate jurisprudence crafted to deal with unique military
circumstances.
To sum up, the special needs policy consideration, which is
unique to military habeas, justifies less federal review of military
convictions than of state convictions. The special needs policy
consideration is implicated when federal habeas review has the
potential to interfere with the operations of the military. This
potential for interference exists when the military determination is a
product of military expertise, and the expertise of the military is
implicated as to questions of law, but not as to questions of fact.
Accordingly, the existence of the special needs policy consideration
leads to the conclusion that federal courts should be more deferential
when reviewing military legal determinations than they are when
reviewing state legal determinations. However, as this Note will
discuss in Part IV.C., with the recent enactment of AEDPA's highly
deferential standard of review for questions of law, there is no reason
for federal courts to be more deferential in reviewing military legal
determinations. Because the special needs policy consideration is not
implicated when a federal court reviews military factual
determinations, federal courts need not be more deferential when
reviewing military factual determinations than they are when
reviewing state factual determinations. For questions of fact, the
policy considerations are the same for state and military habeas.
IV. MILITARY AND STATE HABEAS SHOULD BE THE SAME

The Court did not base its decision in Burns on constitutional
or statutory requirements. 176 Rather, the Court's decision to limit the
scope of review of military convictions was solely a policy decision,
since authority to issue the writs of habeas corpus from state and
military convictions is derived from the same statute. 177 This Note
suggests that the standard and scope of review for state habeas, as

While deference ought to be given to military determinations of the former kind, neither legal
nor policy considerations should bar civilian court review of determinations of the latter sort."
(quoting Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Civilian Judges and Military Justice: CollateralReview of CourtMartial Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 40, 67 (1961)).
176. Developments in the Law, supra note 160, at 1220.
177. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964)).
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laid out in AEDPA, should be applied to military habeas. 178 For the
purposes of this section, it is presumed that the standard and scope of
review for military habeas is governed by the four-factor Calley test
adopted in the Tenth Circuit because it is this Circuit that hears the
most military habeas cases.
Applying AEDPA to military habeas would change military
habeas in two ways. First, application of AEDPA would expand the
scope of military habeas to include review of factual determinations,
though this review would be subject to the deferential standard of
review for factual questions contained in AEDPA. Second, application
of AEDPA would subject federal review of military legal
determinations to AEDPA's deferential standard of review.17 9 Both of
these changes would improve the current state of military habeas.
A. Priorto Burns, the Scope of Review of Military Habeas Was
Approximately the Same as that of State Habeas.
Before proceeding to argue that military and state habeas
should be the same, it should be noted that there is nothing inherently
illegitimate in having the same standard of review and scope of review

178. Some commentators have even gone as far as arguing that there are compelling reasons
for why military decisions should be accorded less deference than state decisions. See id. at 121820. "First, since the military is a federal creation, the federal courts when reviewing a courtmartial conviction need not feel restrained by notions of comity based on federalism." Id. at
1218. Second, Military courts are statutorily created entities which, though authorized by the
Constitution, are not listed as part of the constitutional scheme. Id. at 1218-19. States, in
contrast, are part of the constitutional scheme and are supposed to aid in the in the
interpretation of constitutional standards. Id. at 1218-19. Therefore, their decisions should be
accorded more deference. See id. Finally, there is an argument that state courts require less
supervision in interpreting and applying constitutional standards because, in general, state
trials are "held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while the
military trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." Id. at 1220
(quoting O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969) (footnote omitted)).
179. This Note does not argue that the application of AEDPA should broaden the types of
legal issues that a federal court may review under military habeas. Currently, under the Calley
standard, federal courts may review only claims that allege a violation of the federal
Constitution. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 199 (5th Cir. 1995). In contrast, under state
habeas, federal courts may review some important federal statutory claims as challenges to
convictions insofar as the conviction violates "federal treaties." HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note
129, at 439 ("[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) to mean
that important, but not other, federal statutory claims also are cognizable in federal habeas
corpus proceedings.") These very "limited" set of federal statutes and treaties "bear on the
propriety and condition of criminal confinement by the States and . .. implicate important
principles of national law or important individual liberty interests." Id. at 450. Whether the
scope of review for military habeas should be broadened beyond only claims alleging
constitutional error is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note argues that AEDPA's
standard of review for legal determinations should be applied to military legal determinations
that are already reviewable.
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for both military and state habeas. The Supreme Court's express
comparison of state and military habeas in Burns has led the lower
courts to view military habeas as requiring less federal review than
would be required for state habeas.18 0 The problem is that the
comparison established a baseline relationship between military
habeas and state habeas that is not even historically accurate. The
Court in Burns was incorrect when it stated that the scope of review
has always been narrower for military convictions than for state
181
convictions.
First, the authority that the Burns Court cited, Hiatt v.
Brown, 82 does not support the proposition that the scope of review for
military convictions has always been narrower. Hiatt merely held that
the proper test was the jurisdictional inquiry.1 83 Until three months
prior to Burns, before the Court's decision in Brown, the state test,
too, was merely to inquire into whether jurisdiction was proper. 84 As
one commentator pointed out, "it was only in 1950-the year in which
[Justice] Vinson's historical survey began and ended-that the range
of issues cognizable on civilian habeas corpus became significantly
185
broader than the range on military habeas."'
Second, in the pre-Burns era, the jurisdictional test for military
habeas was functionally the same as the jurisdictional test for state
habeas. On the state side, prior to Brown, federal courts were
permitted to go beyond the jurisdictional inquiry and inquire into
whether the sentence imposed was illegal. 186 With military habeas,
this same exception to the jurisdictional inquiry was also
recognized. 87 Furthermore, as it had done in cases involving state
habeas cases, the Court assessed the merits of constitutional claims in
1 88
military habeas cases by stretching the definition of "jurisdiction."'
Finally, prior to 1867, the scope of review for military habeas
was actually broader than the scope of review for state habeas because
180. See supra Part II.B.2.
181. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953).
182. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
183. Id. at 111.
184. See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
185. Developments in the Law, supra note 160, at 1221.
186. See supra notes 66-67, 103 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Powers v. Hunter, 178 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1949). In Powers, the court
identified jurisdictional issues as 1) whether the court martial was properly constituted 2)
whether it had jurisdiction over person and subject matter, and 3) whether sentence was one
authorized by law. Id. at 145. The court also found that it had jurisdiction to examine the
sentence of the petitioner to see if it was so severe as to violate the due process clause. Id.
188. See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949) (entertaining a claim of double
jeopardy as a ground for voiding jurisdiction and actually ruling on the merits of the federal
question raised in the military habeas claim)
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no issues were cognizable on review for state convictions. While
federal habeas corpus has been available to service members convicted
by a court-martial since 1789, it has been a viable remedy for state
prisoners only since 1867.189
B. The Benefits of Broadening the Scope of Review for Military Habeas
to Include Review of FactualDeterminations
Military habeas would benefit from AEDPA's standard and
scope of review because AEDPA would broaden the scope of review to
include review of factual determinations. This broadened scope of
review, however, would be tempered by a deferential standard of
review, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard.190 As mentioned
in Part II.B.2., the Tenth Circuit, which hears more habeas petitions
than any other Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit preclude any type of
review of factual determinations made by the military because of the
Supreme Court's decision in Burns.191 These interpretations of Burns
have relied on the notion that the scope of review must be narrower
for military habeas than for state habeas. 192 Lower courts have felt
compelled to keep the scope narrower for military habeas because of
the single phrase from Burns, "[I]n military habeas corpus the inquiry,
the scope of matters open for review, has always been more narrow
193
than in civil cases."'
Extending the scope of review to include review of military
factual determinations would not undermine the special needs of the
military and would provide more meaningful protection of the
constitutional liberties of service members. The narrow scope of
review for military habeas resulted from the Burns argument that the
military has special needs (i.e., the special needs policy
consideration). 194 However, as discussed in Part III.B., the special
189. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; see also Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas

Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 932 (1998) ('The First
Congress had no problem deciding what to do about federal habeas for state prisoners. They
simply, flatly prohibited it." (citation omitted)).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
191. The Tenth Circuit is particularly sensitive to the law/fact distinction and will manifestly
refuse to consider constitutional claims that contain questions of fact. See, e.g., Monk v. Zelez,
901 F.2d 885, 888 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 200 (5th Cir. 1975)
('Thus, a conclusion that a military prisoner's claim is one of law and not intertwined with
disputed facts previously determined by the military is one important factor which favors
broader review.").
192. See supra Part II.B.2.
193. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) (citing Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950)).
194. As mentioned in Part III.B., supra, the special needs policy consideration, which is
unique to the military, is basically the need of the military to maintain discipline and effective
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needs policy consideration is not even implicated when a federal court
because factual
determination
a military factual
reviews
determinations are not products of military expertise. Because the
special needs policy consideration is the only policy consideration that
is unique to military habeas, the policy considerations are the same
for state and military habeas when a federal court reviews a factual
determination. As a result, there is very little room to argue that
federal review of military factual determinations should be different
from federal review of state factual determinations.
In addition to the fact that the special needs of the military are
not implicated when a federal court reviews factual determinations,
there are a number of independent reasons why federal courts should
be permitted to review military factual determinations. By broadening
the scope of military habeas review to include review of military
factual determinations, the federal courts would be able to provide
more meaningful protection to service members. A scope of review that
precludes review of factual determinations also precludes review of
many constitutional claims that are mixed questions of law and fact. It
undermines meaningful review of constitutional claims because
constitutional claims are affected by determinations of fact, just as
they are by determinations of law. As commentators and the Supreme
Court have pointed out, the unconstitutionality of a petitioner's
detention often turns on questions of fact.' 95 The potential exists for
military courts to tailor their factual findings so that existing
constitutional standards do not apply, thus leaving the petitioner with
no remedy on collateral review. Even Congress and the Supreme
Court have never absolutely precluded review of state factual
determinations. If AEDPA applied to a federal court's review of a
military factual determination, the decision would be presumed to be
correct, but that presumption could be rebutted by a showing of clear
196
and convincing evidence that the decision was incorrect.
Expanding the scope of review for military habeas also finds
support from state habeas. For example, on the state side, evidentiary
hearings by federal courts occur in only a small percentage of habeas

operations. Increased federal review through habeas petitions has the potential to interfere with
the operations of the military.
195. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra notel29, at 799. Professors Hertz and Liebman cite to
numerous Supreme Court cases supporting this proposition. Id. at 800. 'More often than not,
claims of unconstitutional detention turn upon the resolution of contested issues of fact." Wingo
v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468 (1974). "It is the typical, not the rare, [habeas corpus] case in
which constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested factual issues." Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
196. § 2254(e)(1).
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cases. 197 However, in a large percentage of cases in which there is
more than a summary dismissal, an evidentiary hearing takes
place. 198 Federal courts have the power to grant habeas corpus relief
without holding a hearing, but they are disinclined to do so. 199 "Taken
together, the paucity of grants of the writ absent a hearing and the
statutory requirement that federal courts defer to fairly derived state
court factfindings suggest that in most cases in which the state courts
fail to vindicate the rights of the accused, they do so because of faulty
fact-development procedures." 20 0 The indication is that factual
mistakes due to procedural defects, rather than pure legal mistakes,
are the most likely basis for granting habeas relief from a state
201
conviction.
Further, within the military criminal justice system, judicial
review of court-martial factual determinations is insufficient to justify
precluding federal habeas review of military factual determinations.
First, at the trial level, there are general fairness concerns with the
impartiality of the court-martial and the major recurring problem in
20 2
the military criminal justice system of unlawful command influence.
Though Article 37(a) of the UCMJ prohibits coercion or improper
influence of the participants in a court martial, the problem still
exists. 20 3 Command influence is at least arguably a problem with
respect to military judges since they lack guarantees of life tenure and
salary protection. 20 4 Members of the court-martial panel are
susceptible to command influence due to the varied forms of contact
that they often have with the convening authority outside of the
20 5
proceeding.

197. HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 129, at 799 (citing REPORT ON THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Richard A. Posner, Chair), in FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 468-515 (July 1, 1990) (finding that

district courts hold hearings in only 1.17% of all habeas corpus cases)).
198. Id. at 799 (citations omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 800.
201. Id.

202. Because of the role that the commander plays in the military criminal justice system,
there exists the potential for the commander or his or her representatives to improperly
influence the court-martial proceedings. SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 6-3(A). "In essence,
unlawful command influence results from impermissible command control where a superior
substitutes (or attempts to substitute) his or her judgment for that of a subordinate who should
be allowed to exercise independent judgment." Id. § 6-3(B).
203. See id. § 6-5(A) (discussing numerous cases where command influence was found to be
unlawful); see also Schiesser & Benson, supra note 47 (proposing the removal of the convening
authority to eliminate unlawful command influence).
204. Developments in the Law, supra note 160, at 1224.
205. See SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 6-5(A).
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After conviction by a court-martial, a service member's first
avenue of appeal is to the convening authority, the person who decided
to initiate the court-martial and who selected all of the participants in
the court-martial. 20 6 Unfortunately, this is the service member's best
opportunity for relief because of the broad powers conferred on the
convening authority to act on a case. 20 7 In fact, the only civilian
appellate review of a court-martial conviction, 208 within the military
criminal justice system, is by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces (the CAAF), and this review is not even
guaranteed. 20 9 Further, the CAAF is expressly authorized to review
only questions of law. 210 The result is that there is no civilian review of
court-martial fact finding incorporated into the military appellate
process. Civilian review is important because, at the very least, it
allows for review of court-martial findings by individuals who are not
ultimately accountable to the military.
C. The Benefits AEDPA Would Bring to FederalReview of Military
Legal Determinations.
1. The Tension with State Habeas.
For most of the last five decades, federal review of military
legal determinations has mirrored federal review of state legal
determinations. For military habeas, under most Circuits'
interpretations of Burns, if the constitutional claim of the petitioner is
largely free of factual issues, there is little constraint on a federal

206. See id. § 17-7.
207. Id. § 17-9(A). The convening authority has almost sole discretion to overturn a courtmartial's findings. Id. The convening authority is permitted to disregard both the findings and
the sentence and may suspend, mitigate, or commute a sentence. Id.
208. The next level of appellate review, after the convening authority, usually occurs in the
Court of Criminal Appeals within the branch in which the service member is a member. Id. § 1715. The Court of Criminal Appeals is typically composed of senior judge advocates, although the
judgeships can be filled by civilians.
209. The CAAF will accept review of a case only if two judges vote to do so, but certain cases,
such as death penalty cases must be accepted for review. DAVIDSON, supra note 22, at 62-63.
The CAAF provides more assurances of neutrality because the five civilian judges who compose
the bench are appointed by the president for fifteen-year terms. SCHLUETER, supra note 27, § 1716(A).
210. Admittedly, the line between law and fact becomes blurry and the CAAF has in the past
reviewed questions of fact by classifying them as questions of law. See id. § 17-16(C) (citations
omitted). Also, though the CAAF's authority is limited to questions of law, it does engage in one
form of factual review in that it looks at the trial record to determine if the evidence is sufficient
to support the conviction. Id.
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court in reviewing the claim. 211 The same was true for state habeas up
until the mid-1990s. In the last few years, however, federal review of
state legal determinations has changed dramatically while federal
review of military legal determinations has remained the same. With
the recent enactment of AEDPA and the Court's decision in Williams,
federal courts must now accord significant deference to the legal
determinations of the States. 212 The result is that now federal review
of state legal determinations is more deferential than federal review of
military legal determinations. This has created an anomaly of sorts
because federal courts have always tried to be less intrusive with
military habeas.
An excellent example of the tension that has arisen with
federal habeas review of military legal determinations can be seen in
the Third Circuit case, Brosius v. Warden,21 3 in which the court
examined a petition for habeas corpus from a court-martial conviction
as though it were a petition for habeas corpus from a state
conviction. 214 The court in Brosius first noted that Burns, at the very
least, held that federal courts may not exercise de novo review over
questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, and "may not go
beyond considering whether the military courts 'dealt fully and fairly'
with the claim."21 5 The court then noted that this baseline provides
very little guidance, but that Burns also established that "our inquiry
in a military habeas case may not go further than our inquiry in a
state habeas case." 21 6 The court then assumed, "solely for the sake of
argument," that it could review the determinations of the military as
though they were determinations of a state. Because the court was
reviewing only military legal determinations, the court applied
AEDPA's standard of review for legal determinations to the
21 7
petitioner's claims and ended up rejecting the petitioner's claims.
Most likely, the Third Circuit's interpretation of Burns was
influenced by recent developments in the standard of review applied to
state legal determinations. With the passage of AEDPA and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of it in William v. Taylor, the method
of restricting federal courts acting through petitions for habeas has
been to require a more deferential standard of review as to both

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.C.2.
278 F.3d, 239 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 245-46.
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factual and legal determinations by a state. 2 18 While the focus of most
Circuits that have attempted to articulate a rule of law from Burns
has been to interpret Burns as limiting the scope of review of military
habeas, 21 9 little has been said as to the standard of review to be
applied to those constitutional claims that are subject to review. In
most cases, the courts are unconstrained in their review if the issue is
one of pure federal law. 220 It seems odd now for a federal court to
engage in essentially de novo review of a military legal determination
when a federal court reviewing a state-court determination on the
same claim would be bound by the AEDPA's deferential standard of
review.
2. Problems with the Calley Standard.
As mentioned above, the Calley test is used by the Tenth
Circuit, which hears the most military habeas petitions, and the Fifth
Circuit. The Calley test attempts to effectuate deference to military
determinations of law by constricting the scope of legal issues
cognizable on review. Under Calley, in order for a federal court to
review allegations of constitutional error, the reviewing court must
consider four factors: 1) whether the asserted error is of substantial
constitutional dimension, 2) whether the issue is one of law rather
than of disputed fact already determined by the military tribunals, 3)
whether factors peculiar to the military or important military
considerations require a different standard, and 4) whether the
military courts have given adequate consideration to the issues raised
22 1
in the habeas proceeding.
The first problem with this test for determining the scope of
review is that it provides little, if any, guidance to a reviewing federal
court as to which legal issues it should review. The first two factorswhether the error is of substantial constitutional dimension and
whether the issue is one of law-simply tell a federal court that it may
review only legal issues that allege a violation of the federal
Constitution and that it may not review mere errors of law (e.g. a
violation of a statute). 222 These two factors are all the guidance that
Calley provides, since the last two factors go to the actual merits of the
claim.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 199-203.
Id. at 199-200.
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The last two factors provide a federal court with some guidance
on how to go about reviewing a military legal determination, but they
do not aid in the determination of what military legal determinations
should be reviewed. The third factor-whether factors peculiar to the
military or important military considerations require a different
standard-requires that a reviewing federal court review a military
court's determinations to make sure the "military courts appl[ied] a
proper legal standard to disputed factual claims." 223 The fourth
factor-whether the military courts have given adequate consideration
to the issues raised in the habeas proceeding-- also is not merely
limited to determining whether the military actually reviewed the
petitioner's claim. The court was quite clear that "consideration of
such issues will not preclude judicial review." 224 These last two factors
require a reviewing federal court to evaluate the merits of a
petitioner's claim in order to determine whether it is even permissible
for the court to review the claim. These two factors, quite simply, put
the cart before the horse. If the purpose of the Calley standard is to
effectuate deference to the military by restricting the types of claims
subject to review, reviewing a claim to determine if it is reviewable
would completely undermine the effectiveness of the standard.
The second problem with the Calley standard is that a federal
court, in reviewing legal determinations of the military (in order to
determine whether the issue is even reviewable), will have difficulty
ascertaining how much deference should be accorded to the military's
legal determinations. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, a
federal court, under the last two factors of the Calley test, assesses the
claims of the petitioner. In making this assessment the only guidance
that the court has is that military legal determinations should be
given a "healthy respect, particularly where the issue involves a
determination of disputed issues of fact."225 However, in order to get
this healthy respect, the federal court needs to make sure that the
military court applied the "proper" legal standard. 226 In addition, a
federal court should be "reluctant" to set aside a decision when the
military courts have "determined that factors peculiar to the military
require a different application of constitutional standards." 227 Because
there is no articulated standard of review under Calley, but rather
some vague lip service about giving deference to the military's legal
determinations, there is the potential for a federal court to overcome
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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its "reluctance" to intervene and become unconstrained in its review of
pure legal determinations of the military. Unconstrained federal
review of military legal determinations is problematic because, as
mentioned in Part III.B., military judges have expertise in crafting
and applying constitutional standards due to their experience and
familiarity with the military. As military courts are institutionally
better suited to evaluate the impact of their legal determinations than
are the federal courts, their legal determinations should be accorded
deference.
3. Improvements that AEDPA Would Bring
Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief
unless a state court's decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court
precedent or involves an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court
precedent. 228 The most important improvement to military habeas
that the standard of review of AEDPA would provide is that it would
protect the special needs of the military, and by extension, the
effective operations of the military. By applying this highly deferential
standard of review to military legal determinations, a reviewing
federal court would have to defer to the legal determinations of the
military courts in all but the most egregious circumstances. Unlike the
Calley standard, AEDPA is not vague. It clearly identifies which legal
and factual issues are cognizable on review: all of them. AEDPA
furthers deference through its standards of review, rather than
through a constricted scope of review. As the Calley standard
illustrates, it is difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to effectuate
deference through a restricted scope of review. Inevitably a federal
court ends up reviewing the merits of the claim to determine if it is
reviewable. If a federal court is going to review the claims anyway,
there should be an articulated standard of review that provides
guidance to a federal court. Rather than overcoming "reluctance" in
order to overrule a military court's legal determination, a federal court
must characterize the military court's decision as either an
"unreasonable application of' or "contrary to" Supreme Court
precedent. This deferential standard of review insulates the military's
legal determinations from overreaching by the federal courts.
AEPDA would also be appropriate for military habeas cases
because Congress has already determined that for state habeas cases
this deferential standard of review strikes an appropriate balance
between individual policy considerations and institutional policy

228. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
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considerations. As discussed in Part III.A., there are numerous policy
considerations, common to both military and state habeas, that must
be considered in assessing the proper level of federal review. All of
these policy considerations are incorporated into AEDPA's standard of
review and scope of review, and there is thus very little room to argue
that military habeas should be different from state habeas, given all of
their common considerations. The only policy consideration unique to
the military that would justify a different standard and/or scope of
review is the special needs policy consideration. However, given the
extreme deference that would be accorded to the legal determinations
of the military, this Note submits that the special needs of the military
would not be undermined by applying AEDPA because in most cases
the military's legal determinations, which are products of its
expertise, would withstand scrutiny.
A final benefit that AEDPA would provide is that it would
narrow the universe of precedent that a federal court could consider
when reviewing a military legal determination. Under AEDPA, a
federal court, in assessing whether a military legal determination is
"contrary to" or involves an "unreasonable application of' federal law,
is limited to considering only Supreme Court precedent that is "clearly
229
established."
The military courts, both trial and appellate, provide an important function not fully
realized under prior codes [of military justice]. The current courts generally view
themselves as having an important responsibility for filling gaps otherwise not
addressed by the Code, the Manual, or regulations. Thus, they do more than simply
interpret the meaning of the applicable rules. In many instances, they are called upon to
the constitutionality of a procedure or rule
address, in some cases in the first instance,
230
not found in any of those main sources.

AEDPA's limit of only clearly established Supreme Court
precedent means that the military's resolution of these gray areas of
the law, which is a product of expertise, would withstand scrutiny
when reviewed by a federal court.
V. CONCLUSION

There can be no doubt that military habeas is in need of
reform. Circuits are split on what issues they can review and the level
of deference to apply to military determinations. To improve the
current state of military habeas, this Note suggests that AEDPA's
scope of review and standard of review should be applied to

229. § 2254(d)(1).
230. SCHLUETER, supra note 27, §1-1(B).
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determinations made by the military. This would make federal habeas
review of military convictions the same as federal habeas review of
state convictions.
Applying AEDPA to military habeas would cause two changes to
military habeas: 1) the scope of issues cognizable on review would
expand to include review of factual determinations, though this review
would be subject to a deferential standard of review, and 2) federal
review of military legal determinations would be subject to AEDPA's
deferential standard of review. By broadening the scope of military
review to include review of military factual determinations, protection
of the individual liberties of service members would be bolstered,
while at the same time, the special needs of the military would not be
undermined. AEDPA's standard of review for legal determinations
would also benefit military habeas by providing guidance to federal
courts and by requiring more deference to military legal
determinations, which are products of military expertise.
John K. Chapman*
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